Lancashire Combined Fire Authority

Audit Committee

Meeting to be held on Tuesday 30 June 2026

Risk Management

(Appendix A refers)

Contact for further information – Esma Alicehajic, Senior Business Continuity and Emergency Planning Officer

Telephone: 01772 866 6874

Executive Summary

Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) continues to strengthen its approach to organisational risk management, aligning policy and practice with ISO 31000:2018, National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) guidance, and HM Treasury's Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts. Risk management remains embedded within the Service's governance framework, supporting ongoing scrutiny, informed decision-making and proportionate allocation of resources to risk treatment.

The Corporate Risk Register continues to reflect a broadly stable overall position. Retention and recruitment of on-call staff (11f) and replacement of the existing mobilising system (11g) remain the highest-rated corporate risks. During the latest review cycle, one risk increased, one risk was archived, and two new strategic risks were added relating to the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP), Emergency Services Network (ESN) and Local Government Reorganisation (LGR).

During the reporting period, governance arrangements for strategic risk oversight were revised, with scrutiny of the Corporate Risk Register transferring from the Senior Management Team Corporate Programme Board to the Business and Development Board. This change strengthens the alignment between risk, organisational development and resource planning.

The Service has also continued to develop its risk management framework through closer alignment with HM Treasury's Orange Book. This includes enhancements to the Corporate Risk Register to improve visibility of risk treatment requirements, resource implications and associated financial considerations, enabling the financial and value-for-money consequences of risk treatment to be considered alongside operational risk exposure.

Recommendation(s)

The Audit Committee is requested to:

· endorse the Service’s current risk management arrangements; and

· note the latest position reflected in the Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register at Appendix A.

Overview

Risk management remains a core component of organisational resilience, enabling Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) to anticipate, understand and respond effectively to uncertainty that may impact operational delivery, strategic objectives, financial sustainability or organisational reputation.

The Service continues to operate a tiered approach to risk identification, assessment and escalation, with departmental risk registers informing discussion at Directorate level before escalation to the Corporate Risk Register where risks exceed local tolerance thresholds or present wider organisational implications.

During the reporting period, governance arrangements for strategic risk oversight have been revised. Responsibility for scrutiny of the Corporate Risk Register has transferred from the Senior Management Team Corporate Programme Board to the Business and Development Board. This change is intended to strengthen strategic challenge, improve alignment between risk, organisational development and resource planning, and provide greater visibility of emerging risks, mitigation requirements and any associated resource implications at a corporate level.

Further work has also been undertaken to mature the Service's risk management arrangements. This has included reviewing the Corporate Risk Register against HM Treasury's Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts and incorporating additional fields relating to risk treatment planning, resource requirements and financial implications. These enhancements strengthen decision-making by ensuring that the costs, benefits, affordability and practicality of mitigation measures are considered alongside the level of risk exposure.

Current Risk Profile

The corporate risk landscape remains broadly stable, with no significant change to the Service's highest-rated risks. Retention and recruitment of on-call staff (11f) and replacement of the existing mobilising system (11g) continue to represent the most significant areas of organisational exposure. These risks remain influenced by long-term external factors and sector-wide pressures rather than deterioration in internal controls or mitigation activity.

The following changes have been identified since the previous report to the Combined Fire Authority.

Increased risks

Risk	Description
3d – Fuel	This risk has increased due to a rise in likelihood driven by ongoing geopolitical instability and increasing fuel prices. Whilst supply remains stable and fuel resilience arrangements are in place, previous events have demonstrated that public behaviour, including panic buying, can quickly exacerbate local shortages. The impact remains unchanged.

Archived risks

Risk	Description
1c – Inability to provide sufficient staff in leadership roles	This risk has been archived following continued improvements in workforce planning, leadership development and succession arrangements. Confidence has increased that leadership capacity can be effectively managed through existing business-as-usual processes.

New risks

Risk	Description
11k – ESMCP / ESN	This risk has been added to reflect ongoing uncertainty surrounding the national Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme and transition to the Emergency Services Network. Given the reliance of emergency response on resilient communications, the risk will remain under corporate oversight until greater certainty is established regarding programme delivery, implementation timescales and operational impacts.
12c – Uncertainty and change arising from Local Government Reorganisation (LGR)	This risk has been introduced to reflect the uncertainty associated with Local Government Reorganisation, devolution proposals and potential future changes to Fire and Rescue Service governance arrangements. While the national picture continues to develop, the risk ensures the Service remains sighted on potential implications for governance, funding, partnerships and strategic priorities.

In addition to the movements above, the Service has continued to mature its risk management arrangements. Scrutiny of the Corporate Risk Register has transferred from the Senior Management Team Corporate Programme Board to the Business and Development Board, providing enhanced strategic oversight and alignment between organisational priorities, resource planning and risk exposure.

Further enhancements have also been made to the Corporate Risk Register following a review against HM Treasury's Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts. This includes the introduction of additional information relating to risk treatment options, resource requirements and associated financial implications. These changes provide improved visibility of the investment required to treat risks and support more informed decision-making regarding risk appetite, affordability and value for money.

The Service continues to monitor a range of emerging issues that may influence future risk exposure, including geopolitical instability, economic pressures, workforce challenges, national infrastructure programmes and wider public sector reform. Any material changes will be assessed and incorporated into the Corporate Risk Register through established governance arrangements.

Overall, the risk landscape remains stable and well-managed, with recent movements reflecting emerging strategic issues and changes in the external environment rather than any significant deterioration in organisational resilience.

Business risk

Failure to maintain an effective risk management system could result in significant operational, financial, legal and reputational impacts, and undermine the Service’s ability to meet statutory duties and strategic objectives. The current arrangements are designed to provide proportionate assurance that material risks are identified, escalated and managed through established governance processes.

Sustainability or Environmental Impact

There are no direct sustainability or environmental impacts arising from this report. Where relevant, environmental risks and opportunities will continue to be considered through the Corporate Risk Register and associated risk treatment plans.

Equality and Diversity Implications

There are no direct equality and diversity implications arising from this report. Equality, diversity and inclusion considerations will continue to be assessed where individual risk treatment actions, policies or service changes require further development.

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Will the proposal(s) involve the processing of personal data?  N

Human Resource (HR) implications

Improved consistency, governance and reporting will support managers in managing risks proactively, reducing the likelihood of impact on personnel and improving decision-making confidence. Workforce-related risks, including recruitment, retention, wellbeing and capability, will continue to be monitored through the relevant governance routes.

Financial implications

There are no immediate financial approvals arising from this report. However, the risk management system supports financial planning, value-for-money assessments and cost-benefit considerations linked to mitigation, transfer, treatment or acceptance of risk. Where risk treatment requires additional investment, this will be considered through the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), budget monitoring and the appropriate decision-making route.

Legal implications

Well-governed risk management supports compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and strengthens organisational assurance in relation to scrutiny and accountability frameworks. Specific legal implications arising from individual risk treatment actions will be considered separately where required.

Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985

List of background papers

Paper: Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

Date: 30 June 2026

Contact: Esma Alicehajic, Senior Business Continuity and Emergency Planning Officer

Reason for inclusion in Part 2 if appropriate: Not applicable.

Appendix A: Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

Appendix A

Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

Risk ID	Sub Risk ID	Risk Cause	Triggers	Actions
1		Loss or lack of staff due to	A widespread event or situation that leads to a significant loss of workforce availability and affects the ability to undertake normal business.
	1a	Industrial Action	A local or national dispute with a major or multiple unions leading to staff undertaking partial performance or withdrawal of labour	1) Continue monitoring the position of trade unions on current and future potential disputes. 2) Continue to review operational response models and monitor the trade union position, including through the upcoming Service Review. 3) Develop an options paper in relation to the potential employment of a resilience workforce. 4) Continue to review, update and test business continuity plans relating to industrial action in line with the testing schedule or upon increased likelihood. 5) Continue reviewing and updating the costing of industrial action operations in line with the current economic position. 6) Exercise and test the resilience model. 7) Consider the financial implications of the resilience model aligned to the MTFS. 8) Complete and follow up any recommendations arising from the national resilience industrial action survey.
	1b	Inability to recruit or retain key staff	Decline in available workforce due to a number of factors a. long term illnesses b. high level of retirement c. Service cannot offer competitive salary d. poor levels of recruitment due to social, or financial pressures and capacity of current workforce to undertake promotion processes e. perception of service and culture discouraging applications  f. ineffective recruitment programme	1) Continue to monitor through Workforce Planning arrangements. 2) Raise any shortfalls through Group Managers Meeting or Executive Board as applicable. 3) Evaluate the success of recruitment sources. 4) Financial pressures to be considered as part of workforce planning
	1c	Inability to provide sufficient staff in leadership roles	a. Further to pension changes and turnover there is a need to meet the demand for talented leaders with the ability to work in a changing operating environment	1) The Service continues to offer leadership development to supervisory and middle managers. 2) Advertise leadership vacancies externally.
	1d	Pandemic or ill-health epidemic	An ill-health epidemic or pandemic reducing ability of staff to attend or access to workplace, either due to their own illness, to prevent or reduce transmission and to care for dependants	1) Continuation of updating relevant plans and Health and Safety information in line with newest developments and research. 2) Explore the possibility of developing an early warning trigger mechanism from HR to inform response and emergency planning (REP) action or monitoring on potential increases sickness and absences, by end of quarter 4. 3) Combine learnings from COVID, Pegasus and LFRS Business Continuity Service Management Team (SMT) exercise, tracked through LFRS Assurance Management System (AMS), by end of quarter 4. 4) Continue monitoring developing epidemiological trends via Lancashire Resilience Forum (LRF) partners.
2		Financial Pressures	Insufficient funding or unbudgeted cost pressures that affect financial sustainability and the ability to maintain critical functions.
	2a	Loss of funding	a. Government reduction of grant monies affecting income b. Change in Fair Funding Formula or Business Rates Retention impacting on LFRS share of funding c. Change in local or national economic circumstances resulting in reductions in Council Tax or Business Rates	1) Continue lobbying Government through local Members and MPs. 2) Responding to consultations.
	2b	Overspending and future financial pressures on the MTFS due to increases in the costs of goods, services and pay	a. Unexpected event that leads to rise in costs for goods and services and pay e.g. Fuel costs due to Ukraine war, Global recession b. higher than budgeted pay award	1) Use of the £0.6 million utility volatility reserve to help manage short-term movements in energy costs above budget; 2) Active management of contract indexation, including checking, challenging and validating inflation-related uplifts where appropriate; 3) Re-profiling discretionary non-pay spend where required to help contain in-year pressures; 4) Enhanced financial monitoring and exception reporting where forecast pressures exceed agreed triggers; and 5) Working through sector bodies and other channels to lobby Government for recognition of inflation pressures and any appropriate funding support.
	2c	Future financial pressures on MTFS due to changes in legislation	a. Changes in building regulations resulting in higher costs than assumed in the MTFS, for example Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) requirements. b. New environmental targets resulting in increased costs in the future. c. Net zero targets. d. Changes to employers’ National Insurance contributions.	1) Continue to monitor potential impact, incorporating relevant assumptions into the draft MTFS. 2) Continue to regularly review any potential legislative changes. 3) Review the outcomes of the Spending Review, funding consultations and Autumn Budget.
	2d	Emerging risk associated with grey book pensions and overspending due to increase in costs and administrations associated with changes to pensions	a. Unexpected changes to the pension schemes due to court rulings.	1) Follow government guidance and legislative changes in relation to individual cases. 2) Record rationale for decision making. 3) Provide regular updates to Pension Board and Resources Committee.
3		Loss of Utilities	An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of a utilities services
	3a	Telecommunications	Severe weather, Space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local telecoms infrastructure at LFRS or North West Fire Control (NWFC). This could also be due to loss or withdrawal of contracts from suppliers.	1) Participate in the NWFC business continuity group to address communication back-up arrangements. 2) Implement recommendations from Operation Exercise Blackout. 3) Digital, Data and Technology (DDaT) to evaluate AtHoc Basic Connect licence requirements for LFRS. 4) Communicate the alternative Fire 999 number once established.
	3b (i)	Power outage - Generally	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections.	1) Draft a power outage tactical business continuity plan, informed by the outcome of Business Continuity Management Group workshops, by quarter 1 2026-27. 2) Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of strategically locating mobile generators across Lancashire by quarter 1 2026-27. 3) Produce an appendix to station business continuity plans providing guidance on the use of generators by quarter 1 2026-27.
	3b (ii)	Power outage - SHQ	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections.	1) ICT to review the condition of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to the main server room and provide a report by quarter 1 2026-27. 2) Property to review and discuss any recommended works or actions identified by the generator contractor by quarter 1 2026-27.
	3b (iii)	Power outage - Leadership and Development Centre (LDC)	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections	1) Isolation of photovoltaic (PV) panels on Hangar 54 - requires further investigation to resolve back feed to the generator issues   2) Electrical infrastructure upgrades and resilience to be part of project scope for the development of the site 3) Implementation of the recommendations from the LDC remedial power outage Incident 2024. (under review)
	3c	Water	Large scale failure of water company equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local processing and pumping infrastructure or supply chains, or failure of private company.	1) Conduct a gap analysis on water outage on a county-wide scale, including bottled drinking water, firefighting water, and hygiene requirements. 2) Consider service delivery and training requirements to reduce water needs as required. 3) Investigate multiagency reciprocal agreements
	3d	Fuel	Failure of equipment due to fault, incident, industrial action or malicious attack on national or local infrastructure or supply chains. Geopolitical issues affecting access to fuel from international sources. Public behaviour (panic buying as a result of any of above scenarios)	1) Ensure that bulk fuel storage is consistently maintained at a minimum average level of 75% across all six LFRS locations. 2) A comprehensive review of the light vehicle fleet has been completed, resulting in the diversification of vehicle types to better meet operational requirements at each station. This approach ensures that the fleet includes a range of vehicles, from standard saloon cars to 4x4s and alternatively powered models, thereby supporting the varied activities undertaken by the stations. The implementation of these changes is scheduled for completion by the end of quarter 2. 3)   Review the third-party power supply report for stations to guide the next phase of electrification, and carry out the recommendations by the end of quarter 3.
4		Loss of ICT	Partial or total loss of physical or electronic or virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage or malicious attack.
	4a	Cyber Security	Partial or total loss of electronic or virtual ICT systems due to a malicious attack.	1) A Cyber Security Strategy has been approved by Executive Board. This includes additional managed services to assist with monitoring the environment, investment in next generation perimeter defences such as next generation firewalls, and changes to working practices including stronger password controls and multi-factor authentication. 2) Continue to align with the National Cyber Security Centre best practice security framework as it develops. 3) Maintain an incident response retainer, providing access to a specialist company for potential incidents. 4) Introduce a managed detection and response (MDR) solution. 5) Invest in Local Resilience Forum cyber resilience arrangements. 6) Maintain a dedicated cyber security role. 7) Introduce penetration testing.
	4b	Failure of key ICT systems	Partial or total loss of physical or electronic or virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage or malicious attack.	1) Identify a pathway for Azure migration for data, storage and infrastructure. 2) Exploit cloud-based security controls and increase secure score across subscriptions. 3) Maintain monthly data backups to offline storage with an air gap. 4) Re-architect elements of the network through the firewall refresh to increase resilience and security. 5) Consider further investment to migrate virtual on-premise systems to cloud-based services, including Citrix and VMware.
5		Death or Serious injury of	An incident that causes the death or serious injury of a person either in or interacting with the Service
	5a	A member of staff or contractor during work activities	An incident in the workplace related to general duties such as a member of staff involved in road traffic collision (RTC) whilst undertaking duties, slips trips and falls.	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor.
	5b	A member of staff during operational activities	An incident enroute to, on an incident ground or in operational training scenario such as falling debris.	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor.
	5c	A member of the public due to Service activities	An incident or situation that leads to the death or serious injury of a member of the public. During operational response, training activities or any other public interaction, or incident on Service premises.  or Failure to appropriately assess, inform or safeguard the public from hazards and risks associated with fires	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor.
	5d	Death of member of staff, visitor or contractor due to on service premises	An incident or situation on service premises or estate that leads to death or serious injury. Failure to provide appropriate risk assessment, first aid provision or  training, damaged or faulty equipment or buildings or structures.	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor.
	5e	Failure to identify and implement learning from past events.	Failure to properly investigate and implement actions following recommendations, from a near miss, death or serious injury to mitigate risk for the future	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor.
6		Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads to assess implement and embed.	Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads, this might be due to a significant event requiring learning, new government initiatives or change in political landscape
	6a	Changes to Emergency Response Driver Training which would increase the training requirements for driving	Change in Fire Standard for Emergency Response Driver Training requiring additional workloads in training	1) The increase in course duration for Emergency Response Driver Training is likely to come into force once section 19 of the Road Safety Act changes. However, the duration required under the new legislation is still unknown. This may be partially offset by changes to the trainer-to-student ratio. 2) A review of driver trainer contracts is taking place. 3) Monitor the impact over time to ensure that new entrants can undertake the relevant training and are able to drive appliances. 4) Scope options to further supplement and support the driving school to meet identified deficiencies. 5) Keep abreast of discussions through the Driver Training Advisory Group (DTAG) and Home Office around legislative changes. Latest intelligence suggests that the proposed changes do not appear to be imminent and NFCC is challenging the position. 6) As of 14 May 2026, section 19 has not been introduced. 7) Establish clear prioritisation criteria for driver training allocation to ensure operational risk is managed where training demand exceeds capacity. 8) Secure a second driving instructor from Service Delivery. 9) Explore alternative training delivery models, such as external driving school provision, regional collaboration, extended training hours or modular approaches, to increase throughput where required.
8		Loss of Service Premises	An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of a fire service asset
	8b	Control room	Severe weather, physical or technical attack or failure, general damage to building, denial of access (such as Protests or IA), failure of contracts with third party supplier (such as joint or co-located premises)	1) Continue involvement in North West Fire Control (NWFC) governance structures to assure operations and business continuity arrangements. 2) Continue involvement in NWFC business continuity arrangements and exercises. 3) Actively participate in NWFC Business Continuity Management Group meetings. 4) Monitor the upcoming testing of NWFC's secondary location and capture any learning.
9		Failure to maximise opportunities	An event or situation that could provide an opportunity to improve the Service, which if not utilised could have a negative impact on the Service's progress
	9a	Technological advances	Failure to maximise the opportunities that technological advances present due to a lack of capacity within the ICT or DT department, and an inability of staff to keep pace with new developments that are implemented	1) Initiate and mature the Community Developer concept. 2) Continue to train, educate and develop users’ digital skills. 3) Reassign key resource to progress a strategic technology workstream. 4) Undertake a planned review of DDaT resource and structure to align and optimise resource, provide progression routes with succession planning and remove single points of failure. 5) Executive Board will consider investment in DDaT resource following the above exercise, subject to compelling evidence of risk reduction and value for money.
10		Failure to manage incidents or staff conduct effectively, including inadequate handling of complaints or disciplinary processes, leading to loss of public confidence or reputational damage.	An incident or situation that results in loss of public or staff confidence due to employee conduct (in the workplace, personal life, or on social media), non-compliance with Service policies, the Core Code of Ethics, or EDI principles; compounded by negative media coverage or the Service's mismanagement of the response.
	10a	Failure to provide appropriate communications on events, situations or incidents that could lead to a loss of public confidence in LFRS	An event or situation relating to, loss of public or staff confidence due to Employee conduct at work, in personal life and on social media, failure to adhere to service policy, core code of ethics or Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) and related negative press, or Sector events.	1) Social media sessions to be delivered jointly with HR to address corporate and personal use. 2) E-learning module on use of social media to be created for all staff.
	10b	Failure to implement appropriate people processes in response to staff misconduct or complaints.	Allegations or evidence of staff misconduct (such as bullying, harassment, discrimination). Failure to act in line with Service Values, Core Code of Ethics, Staff Code of Conduct or service policy. Delays or inconsistencies in investigations or decision making. Lack of transparency or perceived fairness in internal procedures	1) Continue delivering training for all line managers on investigative best practices. 2) Continue to strengthen and embed the quality assurance process for misconduct cases. 3) Address adequate capacity/resource in HR or management which could delay case progress, by quarter 4 2026-27. 4) Monitoring and evaluating the strengthening of the professional standards function following the introduction of a 12-month trial of a dedicated Group Manager to support investigation processes.
11		Operational	An event or situation that could impact on LFRS ability to respond effectively and efficiently.
	11a	Rapid external fire spread in high rise premises	An event or situation relating to lack of prevention, protection and operational response leading to a major incident.	1) Continue built environment awareness training for operational and community safety staff. 2) Continue high-rise exercises involving LFRS staff. 3) Continue regulatory activity to ensure remediation of flammable external wall systems and other areas of non-compliance. 4) Implement activities identified through the extraordinary Operational Assurance Group focusing on Grenfell Tower Phase 2. 5) Implement actions arising from the Hong Kong fire, which identified external coverings that may lead to accelerated fire spread. 6) Assess whether Construction Design and Management (CDM) regulations are being appropriately considered through protection activity in relation to buildings under construction or renovation.
	11b	Complete removal of Day Crewing Plus (DCP)	A challenge from a Union to current local agreement.	1) Ongoing engagement with staff and Trade Unions. 2) Assess the impact of reverting some stations to DCP. 3) Trigger a need for an ECR with changes to duty systems possible.
	11c	Lack of required skills of operational staff	A situation where operational staff do not possess the required skill to operate safely at an incident	1) Monitor effectiveness of Operational Assurance Performance Report in disseminating information. 2) Operational Assurance Officers to be mobilised to provide additional assurance at incidents that meet specific criteria, broadly when the risk to FF's is increased. For example this includes operational discretion and critical incidents. 3) LDC continue to work closely with Service Delivery to ensure attendance on Safety Critical mandatory training, monthly performance reports are sent to Head of Service Delivery. 4) LDC trainers are skill graded to ensure they operate consistently in terms of identifying training needs. 5) Review of the internal quality assurance policy and inclusion of Station based assurance activity by qualified personnel in relation to training, by end of quarter 4. 6) Explore opportunities to formalise mentoring or support arrangements. 7) Internal Quality Assurance arrangements are now established for apprenticeships and will be progressively extended across all watches and operational units to ensure consistency, standardisation and oversight of training delivery.
	11f	Retention, development and recruitment of On Call staff	The failure to recruit and retain on-call staff caused by lack of on-call recruiting strategies, not being perceived as a desirable employer, not being competitive in pay rates, not providing enough flexibility to on-call staff with work arrangements.	1) Continue the programme of improvement to identify and make proposals across On Call aimed at improving recruitment, development and retention. 2) Maintain enhanced coordination between the On Call Support Officer Team Leader, Human Resources and Corporate Communications on recruitment targeting. 3) Continue wholetime “Have a Go” events to showcase the On Call role at targeted stations. 4) Implement changes to development requirements, including an approximate 50% reduction in evidence requirements. 5) Develop forward plans for On Call Station Managers to review turn-in and turn-out arrangements, maintenance of skills, levels of demand and employer engagement. 6) Move On Call to the mobile phone app, with additional back-up provided by pagers in areas where mobile signal is limited. Station action plans will accommodate options for either cluster crewing or extended turn-out. 7) Evaluate pay-as-you-go proposals to enable more flexible contracts. 8) Continue 365 recruitment and Area Hubs arrangements. 9) Develop an On Call Service Order to signpost Service guidance. 10) Promote the hybrid working model and consider expansion of green book hybrid working. 11) Continue to implement actions from the On Call academic study, including building on the training and development of On Call Unit Managers and Station Delivery Managers through a development day. 12) Implement three-person crewing proposals. 13) Consider the outcome of the National Joint Council On Call Pay Review consultation, including whether to expand this workstream to resolve issues around time off in lieu (TOIL). 14) Review the new model and the On Call Support Officer function, including redistribution of workstreams to deliver outcomes efficiently by the end of quarter 2 2026-27.
	11g	Replacement of the existing mobilising system as current solution comes to end of life	Delay in implementing the replacement mobilising system delays with supplier, milestone deliver from the FRSs', lack of consensus project implementation.	1) Establish the feasibility and cost of extending the contract with the current mobilising system supplier, pending legal advice and development of extension options. By quarter 1 2026-27, assurance will be gained on cost and timescales. 2) Identify options and contingencies for delivery of the new mobilising system. 3) Identify sources of additional budget where required. 4) Continue director-level engagement. 5) Maintain regular reporting via the project board. 6) Capture lessons learned. 7) Ensure the project team maintains engagement with the supplier. 8) Escalate matters to supplier senior leadership where required.
	11i	Unauthorised access, criminal damage or theft from stations, vehicles, or operational equipment, including during periods when staff may be present on site.	A spate of break‑ins nationally targeting fire stations or vehicles, including when crew are present or nearby.	1. Review and update station security risk assessments for all premises 2. Prioritise investment in physical security enhancements at vulnerable or remote stations (such as lighting, CCTV, alarms) 3. Explore procurement of equipment with tracking or remote-disable features 4. Issue refreshed guidance on securing vehicles and equipment during and outside of operational hours 5. Capture and share lessons learned from recent incidents and near misses 6. Strengthen local police engagement for enhanced patrols, crime trend awareness, and response planning 7. Agree a policy for accessing CCTV systems
	11j	Failing Pager messages	Drill towers on station removed which moves the crews to Pagers and away from alerters	1) Continue internal work to identify routes away from pagers in favour of the app. 2) Ask crews to choose either pager or app where they do not wish to use their own personal devices. 3) Obtain a full report and mitigation plan from Critico. 4) Manage crew behaviour locally when receiving full incident details.
	11k	ESMCP or ESN	Although the project has now started to increase in pace, with further detail emerging around implementation packages and the associated funding model, recent correspondence from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) dated 28 April 2026 confirmed that national delivery of the project is behind schedule. Current estimates indicate full migration by quarter 2 2030. This brings into the risk profile the end of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) price cap on Airwave costs on 1 January 2030. This could expose LFRS to a risk of significant cost increases for the period from January 2030 to April 2030. The full details are not yet known, although sector estimates suggest the potential national exposure could be in the region of £10 million per week.	1) Work is ongoing at service, regional and national levels to prepare for transition to ESN. This is focused on coverage, transition planning, device support requirements and integration with existing systems such as Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD). 2) Work is underway jointly between NFCC and MHCLG to understand the full impact and explore options to mitigate or support the sector. Given the significance of the risks, strategic leads from MHCLG and NFCC now sit on the ESN programme board to represent fire and rescue services.
12		General	An event or situation that could impact on LFRS
	12a	Major lack of effective Management of personal data	A situation or event caused by the lack of effective information management in LFRS	1) Procedure for ensuring appropriate retention of HR records.
	12c	Uncertainty and change arising from Local Government Reorganisation (LGR), devolution proposals, or future changes to Fire and Rescue governance arrangements.	National reform relating to local government structures and Fire and Rescue governance arrangements may create uncertainty and transitional pressures impacting governance, funding, strategic planning, and partnership working.	1) Continue to monitor national developments relating to LGR, devolution and fire governance reform. 2) Maintain engagement with sector bodies, partners and local authorities. 3) Assess emerging impacts on governance, finance, workforce planning and organisational resilience as further information becomes available. 4) Escalate significant emerging risks through appropriate governance arrangements.